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Insurance Liability Law. Bacon Construction Co. v. Arbella
Protection Insurance Co., 208 A.3d 595 (R.I. 2019). If a general
contractor, listed as an additional insured party in its
subcontractor’s commercial general liability policy, voluntarily
dismisses claims against its subcontractor and settles with the
injured subcontractor’s employee, the general contractor cannot
subsequently demand insurance coverage from the liability policy,
nor can the general contractor force the insurance company to
defend it in litigation. 1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Neither party disputed the material facts in this case. 2 On
December 12, 2014, an employee of U.S. Drywall (Drywall), Thiago
Almeida (Almeida), suffered severe physical injuries while working
at a construction site. 3 The plaintiff, Bacon Construction Co., Inc.
(Bacon) was the general contractor and Drywall served as Bacon’s
subcontractor.4 Prior to the injury, Bacon subcontracted Drywall’s
services to perform structural work on the University of Rhode
Island campus and, as part of that work, subcontractor Drywall was
required to purchase a commercial general liability insurance
policy from Arbella Protection Insurance Co. (Arbella), which
contained a provision naming Bacon as an additional insured
party.5 The policy also stipulated that Arbella would provide
defense and indemnification costs to Drywall for lawsuits arising
from its portion of the work on the project (the clause).6
1. Bacon Const. Co. v. Arbella Prot. Ins. Co., 208 A.3d 595 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 597.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The related text of the policy, as highlighted by the Court, reads:
Who is An Insured is amended to include as an additional insured
any person or organization for whom you are performing operations
when you and such person or organization have agreed in writing in
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On June 25, 2015, Almeida filed a complaint in Rhode Island
Superior Court against Bacon, alleging that Almeida was injured
due to Bacon’s negligence. 7 Almeida admitted that he was injured
during the course of his subcontracting work, but Almeida did not
allege that Drywall, his employer, was negligent. 8 In response,
Bacon filed a third-party complaint against Drywall, charging that
the latter was obligated to both defend and indemnify Bacon. 9 On
June 27, 2017, Bacon voluntarily dismissed all of its claims against
Almeida and Drywall with prejudice. 10 Simultaneously, Bacon
tried to recover indemnity and defense costs from Drywall’s insurer,
Arbella, by filing an action requesting declaratory judgment
against Arbella on May 13, 2016. 11 Bacon then moved for summary
judgment.12 In response, Arbella filed an objection and a crossmotion for summary judgment. 13 On July 26, 2017, the Superior
Court justice heard each party’s arguments, then issued a bench
decision.14 The justice determined that Arbella’s insurance policy
was clear in that it limited Bacon’s coverage to actions resulting
from Drywall’s negligence and, because there was no evidence that
Almeida’s injury was caused by Drywall’s negligence, Bacon could
not recover.15 Therefore, the justice granted Arbella’s cross-motion

a contract or agreement, executed prior to an ‘occurrence’, that such
person or organization be added as an additional insured on your
policy. Such person or organization is an additional insured only with
respect to liability for ‘bodily injury’; ‘property damage’ or ‘personal
and advertising injury’ caused, in whole or in part, by:
1. Your acts or omissions; or
2. The acts or omissions of those acting on your behalf; in the
performance of your ongoing operations for the additional insured. Id.
at 599 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 597.
8. Id. See also id. at n.1. Almeida collected workers’ compensation from
Drywall’s insurer.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 598.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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for summary judgment and denied Bacon’s motion for summary
judgment on September 1, 2017. 16 Bacon appealed. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) reviews the
grant of motions for summary judgment de novo. 18 In addition, the
Court adhered to precedent with regard to reviewing a trial justice’s
interpretation of a contract de novo, because “[w]hether an
ambiguity exists in an insurance policy is a question of law[.]” 19
Bacon advanced four arguments of error: (1) Bacon was afforded
additional insurance coverage under a plain interpretation of the
contract; (2) the insurance policy did not include a “negligence
trigger”; (3) the Superior Court justice incorrectly combined the
analysis of an indemnity clause contained within the DrywallBacon contract with the clause in the Arbella policy; and (4) Arbella
did have a duty to defend Bacon in litigation.20 The Court declined
to reach Bacon’s third issue, finding it irrelevant to the Arbella
policy at issue on appeal because the Drywall-Bacon contract was
not at issue on appeal and, more importantly, because Bacon
dismissed all of its claims against Drywall.21
The Court first rejected Bacon’s assertions that Bacon was
entitled to insurance coverage under the Arbella policy and that the
Arbella policy did not contain a negligence trigger. 22 The Court
determined that the clause referred specifically to Drywall as the
“named insured,” while referring to Bacon as the “additional
insured.” 23 Following precedent on contract interpretation, the
Court stated that it “would not depart from the literal language of
the policy absent a finding that the policy is ambiguous.” 24 To
determine whether an ambiguity exists in contractal language, the
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 598–99 (quoting Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dufault, 958
A.2d 620, 625 (R.I. 2008)).
20. Id. at 599.
21. Id. at 599, n.3.
22. Id. at 599–600.
23. Id. at 599.
24. Id. at 600 (quoting Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417, 425
(R.I. 2009)) (brackets omitted).
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Court must “read a policy in its entirety, giving words their plain,
ordinary, and usual meaning.” 25 The Court found it clear that the
clause placed a firm limitation on Bacon’s availability for coverage,
specifically, that Bacon may only receive coverage arising from
situations where Drywall’s actions or omissions make Drywall
liable.26 Although, as Bacon contended, the clause did not contain
the word negligence, the Court was convinced that there was a
negligence trigger in place because the clause included phrases like,
“caused, in whole or in part,” and “liability for ‘bodily injury’” on the
part of Drywall. 27 Furthermore, the clause mandated that a party
must show how the named insured’s actions or omissions caused
the bodily injury, heavily implying the existence of a negligence
trigger. 28 Finally, the Court opined that, were it to follow Bacon’s
argument on liability coverage to its logical conclusion, Bacon
would end up with a greater amount of insurance coverage than
Drywall because Bacon would be covered for personal injury claims
based on negligence while Drywall, the named insured, would be
excluded from such protections. 29
Having rejected Bacon’s arguments regarding coverage and the
negligence trigger, the Court next rejected Bacon’s assertion that
Arbella had a duty to defend Bacon.30 The Court applied the
“pleadings test” to an insurer’s duty to defend. 31 Under the
pleadings test, an insurer has a duty to defend the insured if, when
looking at the content of the complaint, “[the] complaint contains a
statement of facts which bring the case within or potentially within
the risk coverage of the policy[.]” 32 Bacon hung its hat on the word
“potentially,” arguing that because Almeida slipped while working
at the construction site, there was a potential for some
apportionment of contributory negligence to Almeida, and that such
contributory negligence was covered by the language of the
25. Id. (quoting Peloquin v. Haven Health Ctr. of Greenville, LLC, 61 A.3d
419, 431–32 (R.I. 2013)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 601.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of R.I. v.
Charlesgate Nursing Ctr., L.P., 115 A.3d 998, 1004 (R.I. 2015)).
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clause.33 The Court rejected this argument for the simple fact that
the Almeida complaint only alleged negligence against Bacon and,
by voluntarily dismissing its claims against Drywall while reaching
a settlement with Almeida, Bacon fatally closed the door to any
vicarious-liability claims Bacon could have raised. 34
COMMENTARY
The crux of the case rested on two principal points: first, on the
specific language of the contractual clause, and second, on the
procedural fact that Bacon dismissed its claims against Drywall
while settling separately with Almeida. 35 The Court was correct to
uphold the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in Arbella’s
favor. As the Court pointed out, it seems antithetical for a general
contractor to receive greater insurance protection when the main
signatory to the insurance policy is the subcontractor, presumably
a corporation with less financial means and therefore a more vested
interest in receiving protection for whatever it can considering that
the policy explicitly would not cover the subcontractor if a personal
injury resulted from the subcontractor’s negligence. 36
Furthermore, had the Court allowed Bacon’s arguments to seize the
fort, the Court would be torturously twisting the plain language of
the clause which clearly laid out the very narrow circumstances
under which Bacon would be covered by the insurance policy.37 In
effect, the Court would be rendering the clause meaningless. Bacon
would essentially be receiving a ‘free pass’ for making what in
retrospect appears to be an error in procedural legal judgment.
Indeed, both the Superior Court justice and the Court indicated
that had Bacon not voluntarily withdrawn its claims against
Almeida and Drywall, the result would be different altogether
hanging on vicarious liability.38 Finally, this case illustrates what
a poor strategic decision it was for Bacon to voluntarily dismiss its
claims against the other parties because the Court appeared to
leave the door open for vicarious liability as an avenue for Bacon’s
33. Id. at 601.
34. Id. at 601–02.
35. See id. at 602.
36. See id. at 600.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 602.
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recovery, an avenue that was effectively closed by Bacon’s own
actions.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Superior Court, holding that (1) Bacon, as general contractor, was
not entitled to coverage under the “additional insured” clause of
Arbella’s commercial insurance policy, and (2) Arbella, the insurer,
did not have a duty to defend Bacon in the underlying action.39
Lucas A. Sylvia

39.

Id. at 595.

